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I.

INTRODUCTION

The overriding significance jurors normally give to eyewitness testimony,' coupled with the grave consequences of incorrect identifications, 2 has recently compelled courts to consider
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I Courts have long recognized the "overwhelmingly influential" impact eyewitness identifications have on juries. E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9 (1979).
See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[M]uch eyewitness identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries. Juries
seem most receptive to, and not inclined to discredit, testimony of a witness who
states that he saw the defendant commit the crime."); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 120 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Jiuries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to [identification] evidence."); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d
1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("[Jiuries almost unquestioningly accept eyewitness testimony."); United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471, 475
(8th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he in-court testimony of an eyewitness can be devastatingly
persuasive.").
Indeed, numerous psychological studies demonstrate that jurors "seem[] to
find it proof enough when a single person implicates another with a remark such as
'I am certain that's the man!'. . . [They also] have been known to accept eyewitness
testimony pointing to guilt even when it is far outweighed by evidence of innocence." LoFrus, supra, at 9. See also P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965) ("[Elvidence of identification, however untrustworthy, is
'taken by the average juryman as absolute proof.' ") (footnote omitted). As the
Second Circuit has explained:
There can be no reasonable doubt that inaccurate eyewitness testimony
may be one of the most prejudicial features of a criminal trial. Juries,
naturally desirous to punish a vicious crime, may well be unschooled in
the effects that the subtle compound of suggestion, anxiety, and forgetfulness in the face of the need to recall often has on witnesses. Accordingly, doubts over the strength of the evidence ofa defendant's guilt may be resolved
on the basis of the eyewitness 'seeming certainty when he points to the defendant and
exclaims with conviction that veils all doubt, "that's the man!"
Kampshoffv. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1067 (6th
Cir. 1976) ("[O]f all the evidence that may be presented to a jury, a witness' incourt statement that 'he is the one' is probably the most dramatic and persuasive.").
2 Erroneous convictions based on mistaken identifications not only insulate the
guilty but, more significantly, imprison the innocent. See In re Winship, 397 U.S.
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adopting additional safeguards against the increasingly recognized unreliability inherent in such testimony.' Over twenty
years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized
the "vagaries" 4 of eyewitness testimony in establishing constitutional protections against the admission of identifications made
358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A] fundamental value determination of
our society [is] that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free."); United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("[B]etter ten guilty persons should go free than one innocent person be convicted.") (footnote omitted). As one commentator has noted, unreliable identifications constitute "conceivably the greatest single threat to the achievement of our
ideal that no innocent man shall be punished." McGowan, ConstitutionalInterpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1970) (footnote
omitted).
3 Courts have traditionally regarded eyewitness identification evidence as reliable. That view is best demonstrated by their adherence to the "one-witness rule,"
which sustains convictions based upon a single eyewitness' uncorroborated identification. See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 274 (4th Cir. 1974) ("It is
now settled beyond argument that the identification of a criminal actor by one person is itself evidence sufficient to go to the jury and support a guilty verdict and that
application of this rule is not so fundamentally unfair as to be per se a denial of due
process.") (citations omitted). Rejected in Great Britain, the one-witness rule underscores American courts' longheld adherence to the trustworthiness of eyewitness testimony. See People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 359, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
244, 690 P.2d 709, 717 (1984) ("The rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness
is sufficient to prove identity . . . is premised in part on the assumption that an
eyewitness identification is generally reliable.").
Increasingly, however, courts have recognized that "eyewitness identification
evidence is notoriously unreliable." Watkins, 449 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("At least since [1967 the Supreme Court] has recognized the inherently suspect qualities of eyewitness identification evidence.") (footnote and citation
omitted). See also Kampshoff, 698 F.2d at 585 ("[T]he experience of law and psychology has been that eyewitness testimony may sometimes be the least trustworthy
means to identify the guilty.") (footnote omitted); Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108,
112 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Centuries of experience in the administration of criminal justice have shown that convictions based solely on testimony that identifies a defendant previously unknown to the witness . . . [are] highly suspect. Of all the various
kinds of evidence it is the least reliable, especially where unsupported by corroborating evidence."). Despite that growing judicial skepticism, however, public
policy concerns compel continued judicial adherence to the one-witness rule. See
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The one witness
rule recognizes that certain crimes are solitary, and as to such crimes both the deterrence of punishment and the rehabilitation of offenders are proper concerns of
the state."). But see United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring) (urging reassessment of the rule because its reliability
rationale is, "at best, highly dubious, given the extensive empirical evidence that
eyewitness identifications are not reliable").
4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). In so doing, the Court
explained that the unreliability "of eyewitness identification [is] well-known; the
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." Id. (citing
F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZEYFI 30 (1927)) (footnote omitted).
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at or arising from certain unduly suggestive pretrial procedures. 5
Despite that recognition, however, the Court has subsequently
dismantled the scope of those constitutional protections. Specifically, the Court has insulated certain pre-trial procedures and
shifted the focus of the admissibility determination from the
suggestiveness of the procedure to the reliability of the resulting
identification. 6
Hence, eyewitness identifications solicited
5 On June 12, 1967, the Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, issued three
landmark decisions which extended two constitutional protections to certain pretrial identification procedures. First, in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court held that the sixth
amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to counsel at lineups, that
pretrial identifications made at illegal lineups are per se inadmissible, and that subsequent in-court identifications are inadmissible unless the prosecution establishes
by clear and convincing evidence that the prior sixth amendment violation did not
taint the in-court identification. Second, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967),
the Court held that the due process clause mandates the exclusion of identification
evidence which the totality of the circumstances demonstrates arose from pretrial
procedures unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.
Significantly, the Court expressly recognized that its holdings "were not foreshadowed in our cases" and that "[t]he overwhelming majority of American courts
have always treated the evidence question not as one of admissibility but as one of
credibility for the jury." Stovall, 388 U.S. at 299-300 (citation omitted). However,
the Court explained that "the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the
suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification" compelled its
departure from that majority position and its adoption of the constitutional protections enunciated in the Wade trilogy. Wade, 388 U.S. at 235. See also Manson, 432
U.S. at 111-12 ("The driving force behind . . . [the Wade trilogy] was the Court's
concern with the problems of eyewitness identification.").
The following year, the Court, in extending the due process rule of Stovall to
pretrial photographic identification procedures, reiterated that the Wade trilogy
represents the Court's "first depart[ure] from the rule that the manner of an extrajudicial identification affects only the weight, not the admissibility, of identification
testimony at trial." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382 (1968). In Simmons, the Court held that an in-court identification resulting from pretrial photographic confrontations violates due process "only if the photographic identification
procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 384.
6 The Court has limited the sixth amendment right to counsel recognized in
Wade and Gilbert to procedures occurring after initiation of the formal criminal process. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Court held that the sixth amendment applies only to those line-ups conducted post-indictment. In dissent, Justice
Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Wade, emphasized that the majority of
state courts and "every United States Court of Appeals that has confronted the question has applied Wade and Gilbert to pre-indictment [lineup] confrontations." Id. at
704 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300 (1973), the Court refused to extend Wade and Gilbert to photographic
identification procedures at any stage of a criminal proceeding. Id. at 321. Because
they address procedures which precede postindictment lineups, Kirby and Ash constitute an indisputable retreat from Wade, which had expressly recognized that wit-
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through unnecessarily suggestive procedures are nevertheless
admissible should they bear sufficient indicia of reliability as
demonstrated by five factors.7 Although those very factors have
been criticized as lacking an empirical basis,8 their emphasis on
reliability has established an independent foundation for admitting identifications made at or arising from pretrial procedures
recognized as overly suggestive. 9
Even before their subsequent dilution, the original constitutional safeguards offered no protection against the inherent unreliability of admitted eyewitness testimony. Courts have
traditionally refused to adopt additional protections by finding
nesses rarely change prior identifications. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229 ("[Olnce a witness
has picked out the accused ... , he is not likely to go back on his word later on.").
More significantly, the Court has diluted the right to due process articulated in
Stovall by changing the focus of the admissibility determination. In Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972), the Court refocused its admissibility analysis from procedural
fairness to the accuracy of the identification, prescribing factors which may demonstrate sufficient reliability to admit an identification demonstrably tainted by an unnecessarily suggestive procedure. See infra note 7. In Manson v. Brathwaite, 422
U.S. 98 (1977), the Court reaffirmed that refocusing, explaining that "reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony" and concluding that the Biggers reliability factors should be weighed against "the corrupting
effect of the suggestive identification itself." Id. at 114.
7 The so-called Biggers factors are: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness' at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
8 For example, several psychologists have argued that no direct correlation exists between accuracy and a witness' level of confidence or certainty. See, e.g.,
Uelmen, Testing the Assumptions of Neil v. Biggers: An Experience in Eyewitness Identification, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 358, 368 (1980); Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship, in LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
243, 250-52 (1980). Lower courts have cited those studies and echoed that criticism. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) ("In
fact, the data reveal no correlation between witness certainty and accuracy.").
9 Indeed, Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), constitutes "the only case
in which the Supreme Court has found identification procedures violative of due
process." Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1986) (NelsonJ., dissenting). In Foster, the Court addressed a pretrial procedural history in which the victim
failed to identify the defendant from a three-person lineup in which he "stood out
from the other two men by the contrast of his height and by the fact that he was
wearing a leather jacket similar to that worn by the robber"; tentatively identified
him in a one-to-one showup, a practice which the Court recognized had been
"widely condemned"; and positively identified him from a second lineup in which
the defendant was the only repeat participant. Id. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the Court explained that the suggestiveness of the underlying procedures "so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate
due process" because, "[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is
the man.' " Id. (emphasis in original).
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that the post-admission problem of unreliability is sufficiently addressed by existing trial mechanisms such as cross-examination,
closing argument and cautionary jury instructions.'0 However,
the increasing amount of psychological evidence suggesting that
eyewitness testimony is inherently untrustworthy I has created a
growing call for the adoption of additional procedures aimed at
reducing the risk of erroneous convictions based upon mistaken
identifications.
This article discusses the most effective, and most controversial, procedure: expert testimony on eyewitness perception.
Although the vast majority of appellate courts have rejected such
testimony as an improper subject of expert commentary, the
Third Circuit, in its "trailblazing opinion"' 2 in United States v.
Downing, 3 rejected a blanket inadmissibility rule and instead held
10 Most notably, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that eyewitness
identifications are so inherently unreliable that "special considerations justify a departure" from those normal protective devices. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341,
348-49 (1981). In so doing, the Court reiterated that "[wihile identification testimony is significant evidence, such testimony is still only evidence, and .. .is not a
factor that goes to the very heart-the 'integrity'-of the adversary process." Id. at
348 (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 n.14 (1977)). Accordingly,
the Court held that the admissibility of pretrial identification evidence may be determined in the jury's presence because cross-examination, closing argument and
cautionary jury instructions constitute sufficient protections against any undue prejudice which might result should the identification subsequently be deemed inadmissible.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that both cautionary jury instructions and cross-examination are insufficient protective devices
against unreliable eyewitness testimony. Regarding the former, he noted that "[t]o
expect ajury to engage in the collective mental gymnastic of segregating and ignoring such testimony upon instruction is utterly unrealistic." Id. at 356 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Regarding the latter, he stated that "cross examination is both an ineffective and a wrong tool for purging inadmissible identification evidence from the
jurors' minds ...because all of the scientific evidence suggests that much eyewitness identification testimony has an unduly powerful effect on jurors." Id. at 35657 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan then posited that such normal protective devices are as demonstrably inadequate against the unreliability of identification evidence as they are against the unreliability of involuntary confessions.
Noting that the Court had previously recognized the latter inadequacy inJackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), which mandated a "fair hearing" of the exact type
rejected in Watkins, he concluded that because "jury instructions [and cross-examination] can ordinarily no more cure the erroneous admission of powerful identification evidence than they can cure the erroneous admission of a confession... [t]he
separate judicial determination of admissibility required by Jackson for confessions
is equally applicable for eyewitness identification evidence." Watkins, 449 U.S. at
350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
II See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
12 United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 1988).
13 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
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that "expert testimony on eyewitness perception may be admitted at least in some circumstances." 1 4 In so holding, the Third
Circuit in 1985 became, and today remains, the sole United
States court of appeals to reverse a district court's exclusion of
such testimony.
This article analyzes the majority position, which in effect rejects absolutely the use of expert identification testimony, and
the alternative admissibility standard articulated by the Third
Circuit. It concludes that the latter standard properly conforms
to the liberal requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
recommends the increased admission of such testimony as the
most effective protective device against the inherent unreliability
of admitted identifications. However, it posits that the vast majority of trial courts, including those within the Third Circuit, will
continue to improperly exclude such expert testimony as a matter of course.
II.

EXPERT IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY:

ITS CONTENT AND

CONTROVERSIAL ROLE

Expert testimony on eyewitness perception focuses on specific factors affecting memory and perception. Experts generally
recognize three stages of identification: acquisition (the initial
perception of the event), retention (the time elapsed between the
event and the eventual recollection), and retrieval (the recall of
stored information).' 5 They also identify factors at each stage
which may affect reliability. Several such factors fall into three
broad categories: (i) those particular to the witness, such as training;' 6 (ii) those particular to the event, such as stress; 17 and (iii)
those particular to the suspect, such as race.' 8 Additional factors
include the "forgetting curve," which describes the disuniform
rate at which memory diminishes; the "assimilation factor,"
which recognizes that eyewitnesses often improperly incorporate
Id. at 1232.
See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 464 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 124 (1988).
16 For instance, contrary to common belief, "research show[s] that police officers have no greater accuracy than laypersons in making identifications." Id. at
464.
17 As the Third Circuit has recognized, "contrary to common understanding,
stress causes inaccuracy of perception and distorts one's subsequent recall." Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230.
18 Studies have consistently demonstrated that cross-racial identifications are inherently unreliable. See, e.g., Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors In Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984).
14
15
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into their identifications inaccurate information acquired after,
but confused with, the event; the "feedback factor," which explains that eyewitnesses who discuss the case with one another
improperly reinforce their individual identifications; and, contrary to judicially endorsed understanding,' 9 the absence of any
correlation between confidence and accuracy. 20 To varying degrees, each such factor "goes beyond what an average juror
might know as a matter of common knowledge, and indeed some
of them directly contradict 'common sense.' ",21 Accordingly, expert identification testimony is proffered to persuade jurors that
certain circumstances may render an eyewitness identification
unreliable or, at a minimum, less reliable than laypersons would
otherwise believe.
As one commentator has explained, the controversy surrounding the admissibility of such testimony primarily arises
from differences between its source and subject matter and those
of other forms of expert evidence.2 2 Its source is distinct in two
significant respects. First, the judiciary has largely perceived it as
emanating not from technical experts but from academicians and
psychologists whose simulated experiments lack practical significance. 2 3 Second, criminal defendants are virtually the only liti24
gants who proffer it.
More significantly, its subject matter is unusual in three primary aspects. First, despite its counter-intuitive nature, 5 expert
identification evidence addresses topics about which lay persons
have some experience and opinion; indeed, courts most frequently justify its exclusion by deeming its subject matter within
1) See supra note 8.

20 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230.
21 Id. at 1231. See also United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.
1986) ("Expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is not simply a recitation of facts
available through common knowledge" but rather a description of tested conclusions which "are largely counter-intuitive, and serve to 'explode common myths about
an individual's capacity for perception.' ") (emphasis in original); State v. Moon, 45
Wash. App. 692, 699, 726 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1986) (deeming expert identification
evidence "critical in some cases since its results are best described as counter-intuitive; that is, contrary to the common understanding or belief of most people").
22 See Sanders, Expert Witnesses In Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 1409, 1422-25 (1986).
23 Id. at 1413. See infra notes 40 and 42.
24 Sanders, supra note 22, at 1413. Cf. Robertson v. McCloskey, 680 F. Supp.
408, 410 (D.D.C. 1988) (in excluding expert identification testimony in a civil case,
explaining that those courts which have admitted it have done so on the "fundamentally different premise[]" of "protecting the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants").
25 See supra note 21.
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common knowledge.2 6 Second, because identification experts
are prohibited from addressing the accuracy or reliability of a
specific witness' identification,2 7 their testimony is necessarily
quite general, often to such a degree that its relevance is questioned. 28 Third, the underlying clinical conclusions are not universally accepted, 2 9 and some psychologists argue that the
practical effect of expert identificaiton testimony is to hinder,
rather than to assist, jurors by creating overskepticism or
confusion.3
III.

THE TRADITIONAL EXCLUSION OF EXPERT IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY:

UNITED STATES V AMARAL

The vast majority of appellate courts have held either that
expert testimony on eyewitness perception is inadmissible or that
a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit
26 See infra notes 36-37.
27 As many courts have recognized, expert testimony regarding the reliability of
a particular eyewitness's identification would constitute an improper attack on credibility by extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter. See, e.g., State v. Buell, 22 Ohio
St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795, 804 (1986) ("[E]xpert testimony . . . regarding the
credibility of the identification testimony of a particularwitness is inadmissible...
absent a showing that the witness suffers from a mental or physical impairment
which would affect the witness' ability to observe or recall events.") (emphasis in
original). See generally State v. Cooper 708 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(recognizing that in cases where such expert testimony had been admitted it "was
generally confined to an analysis of the psychological factors affecting eyewitness
identifications, and avoided commenting upon the credibility of any particular
witness").
28 See infra note 45.
29 See infra note 30. But see People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 360, 690 P.2d
709, 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 245 (1984) (noting that "It]he consistency of the
results of these studies [demonstrating the inherent unreliability of eyewitness
identifications] is impressive, and the courts can no longer remain oblivious to their
implications for the administration of justice"). See also infra note 51.
30 See, e.g., McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can a Psychologist Tell
A Jury, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 550 (1983). McCloskey and Egeth dispute the contentions that (1) jurors "overbelieve" eyewitnesses and require expert evidence to increase their skepticism, and (2) that expert identification testimony actually
improves a juror's ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate identifications. Id. at 551.
Several courts have expressly relied upon their studies to exclude expert identification testimony. For instance, the Ninth Circuit-which has consistently excluded such testimony, see infra note 35-has cited McCloskey & Egeth for the
proposition that "[p]sychologists do not generally accept the claimed dangers of
eyewitness identification in a trial setting." United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d
1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987). However, at least one court has argued that their conclusions "ha[ve] been vigorously disputed by their peers" and dismissed their concerns as an improvident plea for additional research. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d at 369
n.15, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.15, 690 P.2d at 721 n.15.
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it. 3 1 In "probably the leading case on the subject, ' 32 the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the exclusion of such testimony sixteen years ago
in United States v. Amaral 3s by holding that it failed to satisfy a
four-pronged standard for the admission of expert evidence. 4
Although purporting to frame its holding in terms of deferring to trial court discretion, Amaral in effect held such testimony
inadmissible as a matter of law by finding that it was not a
"proper subject" of expert evidence.3 5 Most courts which have
31 See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, 610, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (Co.
Ct. 1985) ("Courts have traditionally been reluctant to permit expert testimony as
to the reliability of identification testimony."); State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 476,
507 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1986) ("Almost uniformly, state and federal courts have upheld the trial court's exercise of discretion to exclude such testimony."); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 172, 512 A.2d 1056, 1064 (1986) ("The vast majority
of courts have rejected such evidence."); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371,
1375 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The admissibility of this type of expert testimony is strongly
disfavored by most courts."). See generally Annotation, "Admissibility, at Criminal
Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony," 46 ALR
4TH 1047 (1987).
However, as criminal defendants are essentially the only parties who proffer
such testimony, see supra note 24, "the virtual unanimity of appellate decisions on
the topic may well be misleading" because the admissibility determination is appealed only where the trial court excludes the testimony and the defendant is subsequently convicted. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d at 360 n.10, 690 P.2d at 718 n.10, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 245 n.10. The prosecution cannot appeal an acquittal, and neither
party will appeal the testimony's admission should the defendant be convicted. Id.
Hence, "appellate courts ordinarily confront the issue only when the testimony has
been excluded." Id. (emphasis in original).
Appellate decisions addressing other issues demonstrate that trial courts have
admitted expert identification testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d
1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981) (Although "sympathetic with the government's position" on appeal of the trial court's pretrial order admitting expert identification
testimony, the court refused to address its merits for lack of jurisdiction.). See generally State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981) (describing a
proffered expert's affidavit detailing that she had previously testified in more than
34 trials and that another such expert had testified in more than 20 trials).
32 State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 291, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218 (1983).
33 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). Amaral deemed the admissibility of expert
identification testimony "a novel question" and noted that counsel had cited "[n]o
appellate or trial court decision .

.

. resolving the issue."

Id. at 1153.

The four criteria articulated in Amaral for the admissibility of expert testimony
are whether the expert is qualified, whether the subject matter is proper for expert
testimony, whether the proffered testimony conforms with a generally accepted
theory, and whether its probative value outweighs its potential prejudicial effect.
Id.
35 Indeed, "[diespite the multi-tiered framework it established, Amaral addressed only the ... [proper subject] factor" of its four-prong test. United States v.
Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Specifically, Amaral described the relevant issue as whether expert identification testimony
would "appreciabl[y] help" the jury. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152. See also infra note
59. In answering that issue negatively, the court stated that "[clertainly effective
34
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adopted the Amaral standard have similarly relied upon that criterion to exclude expert identification testimony.3 6 Two distinct
rationales underlie the position that such testimony is an improper subject for expert comment. The most prevalent justification, adopted on at least one occasion by five United States
courts of appeals, 37 is that the testimony's subject matter is
within the common knowledge of laymen and, hence, would not
assist jurors. 3 8 Another rationale often articulated is that such
cross-examination is adequate to reveal any inconsistencies or deficiencies in the
eye-witness testimony." Id. at 1153. See supra note 10, infra note 118. Theoretically, that rationale should apply equally to all cases and, hence, direct the blanket
exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness perception.
Jurists have subsequently recognized that Amaral, despite its language to the
contrary, effectively eliminated any discretion to admit expert identification testimony. See Lang/ord, 802 F.2d at 1184 (Ferguson,J., dissenting) (criticizing Amaral's
"blanket rule of exclusion in every case" and chiding its abuse-of-discretion standard as "a meaningless charade"). But see United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 468
n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a suggestion that Amaral and its progeny led the district court to believe that it had no discretion to admit such testimony). Despite
increasing judicial criticism of Amaral, however, the Ninth Circuit most recently reaffirmed its holding by "adher[ing] to the position that skillful cross[-]examination
of eyewitnesses, coupled with appeals to the experience and common sense ofjurors, will sufficiently alert jurors to specific conditions that render a particular eyewitness identification unreliable." Christophe, 833 F.2d at 1300.
36 See Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220 (recognizing that the "basis for
the view that eyewitness identification is not a proper subject to expert testimony is
the same as that adopted in [Amaral] and in the great majority of cases which have
routinely followed Amaral").
37 See Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153 ("[T]hejury was 'superbly equipped' to evaluate
the impact of stress . . . on the perception of the identification witness."); United
States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding that such testimony is "not sufficiently beyond the understanding of lay jurors"); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he jury can adequately weigh these
problems through common sense evaluation."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that such testimony would be of"little use to the jury"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United
States v. Fosher, 449 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1978) ("[A]verage lay jurors, on the
basis of their own life experience and common sense, can make an informed evaluation of eyewitness testimony without the assistance of a psychologist."), aff'd, 590
F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (agreeing that such testimony is "no[t] sufficiently
beyond the ken of lay jurors").
38 State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 475, 507 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1986) ("Matters
such as these, however, have generally been found to be within the realm of common experience and can be evaluated without expert assistance."). See also Nelson
v. State, 362 So.2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("[I]t is within the common knowledge of the jury that a person being attacked and beaten undergoes
stress that might cloud a subsequent identification of the assailant by the victim.");
State v. Ammons, 208 Neb. 812, 813, 305 N.W.2d 812, 814 (1981) ("[A]ccuracy or
inaccuracy of eyewitness observation is a common experience of daily life."); Dyas
v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.) ("[T]he subject matter of the proffered
testimony is not beyond the ken of the average layman nor would such testimony
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testimony would usurp the jury's function, or invade its exclusive
domain, by touching on an ultimate fact in issue.3 9
Other courts, including the First and Seventh Circuits, have
excluded expert identification testimony by finding that it has not
attained general acceptance in the legal and scientific communities.4" In so finding, those courts, relying upon the test enunciated in Frye v. United States 4 ' for determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence, have focused on the laboratory nature
of the underlying research experiments4 2 and their occasionally
aid the trier in a search for the truth."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); People v.
Plasencia, 168 Cal. App. 3d 546, 555, 214 Cal. Rptr. 316, 321 (1985) ("The jury did
not need edification on the obvious fact that an unprovoked gang attack is a stressful event or that the passage of time frequently effects one's memory."); State v.
Fernald, 397 A.2d 194, 197 (Me. 1979) (stating that reliability factors regarding
facial identifications are "part of the day-to-day experiences of ordinary lay
people").
39 See, e.g., Thevis, 665 F.2d at 641 ("To admit such testimony in effect would
permit the proponent's witness to comment on the weight and credibility of opponents' witnesses."); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976)
(affirming the exclusion of expert identification testimony because "opinion evidence cannot usurp the functions of the jury or be received if it touches the very
issue before the jury"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Brown,
501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming such an exclusion based on the trial
court's finding that the proffered testimony "would invade the province of the
jury"), revd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975);
Caldwell v. State, 594 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (deeming such testimony
"an invasion into the province of the trier of fact"); People v. Brooks, 51 Cal. App.
3d 602, 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 492, 498 (1975) (noting that such testimony would
"take over the jury's task."); State v. Stucke, 419 So.2d 939, 945 (La. 1982) ("such
testimony invades the province of the jury and usurps its function"); State v.
Goldsby, 59 Or. App. 66, 69, 650 P.2d 952, 954 (1982) (rejecting such testimony
because it would improperly allow "expert witnesses to debate the quality of the
evidence for the jury"); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982) ("[S]uch
testimony would amount to a lecture to the jury about how they should perform
their duties."); State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 397, 658 P.2d 183, 193 (1985) (such
testimony "invades the province of the jury to determine what weight or effect it
wishes to give to eyewitness testimony").
40 See, e.g., Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383 ("[Tihe offer did not make clear that the testimony . . . would be based upon a mode of scientific analysis that meets any of the
standards of reliability applicable to scientific evidence."); Watson, 587 F.2d at 369
("[W]ork in that field still remains inadequate to justify its admission into evidence."). See also Caldwell, 594 S.W.2d at 28 (Although the "field of perception and
memory is alleged to be a science.. . [t]he science of human perception testimony
is new."); Plasencia, 168 Cal. App. 3d 555, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (such testimony
"had not yet reached a state of acceptability in the legal community and therefore
could not be used at trial").
41 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In affirming the exclusion of a precursor to the
lie detector, the court in Frye held that "scientific principle or discovery . . . from
which the deduction is made must ... have gained general acceptance in the particular field." Id. at 1014.
42 See, e.g., Stucke, 419 So.2d at 945 ("[T]he crimes are staged [in the research
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contradictory results.43 Finally, many courts have excluded such
testimony on the basis of undue prejudice resulting from the anxiety that the jury will place too much weight on the expert's testimony,4 4 the confusion that might result from its necessarily
general content, 45 and the time it would consume, 4 6 particularly
should a feared "battle of experts" result.4 7
IV.

ANALYZING THE AMARAL

CRITERIA

The rationales utilized to support the exclusion of expert
identification testimony under the Amaral criteria are either outexperiments]; the person acting as the criminal and very often the victim are both
actors. No actual crime has been an issue in [the] studies and none of [the] victims
have been shot in [the] staged crimes."). See generally State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d
124, 129, 489 N.E.2d 795, 801 (1986). ("The statistical likelihood of eyewitnesses
to err ... would not assist the trier of fact to determine whether a particulareyewitness . . .is telling the truth.") (emphasis in original).
43 See supra note 30.
44 See, e.g., United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[Tlhe
unfair prejudice which might have resulted because of the aura of reliability and
trustworthiness that surrounds scientific evidence outweighed any small aid the expert testimony might have provided.") (quoting United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d
381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979)); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 637 (M.D. Pa.
1975) ("[T]here was a substantial risk that the credentials and persuasive powers of
the expert would have had a greater influence on the jury than the evidence
presented at trial, thereby interfering with the jury's special role as fact finder.").
45 See, e.g., United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming
such testimony's exclusion based partially on its "abstract, general nature"); United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that because the expert
"did not comment specifically on the identification . . .but instead testified generally as to problems with eyewitness identification," his testimony would be "marginally relevant"); Fosher, 590 F.2d at 382 (noting that the "written offer did not
make clear the relationship between the scientific evidence offered and the specific
testimony of the eyewitnesses").
46 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he
undue consumption of time would substantially outweigh its probative value.").
47 In Downing, the Third Circuit explained that
[s]ome courts, concerned with the prospect of creating a new 'cottage
industry' of psychological experts who will be asked to testify in every
case involving eyewitness testimony, and with the spectre of criminal
cases turning into a 'battle of the experts' that misleads the jury and
confuses the issues, have excluded this expert testimony on the grounds
that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1243 n.27 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Thevis,
665 F.2d at 641 ("To admit such testimony in effect would... open the door to a
barrage of" identification experts.); Fosher, 590 F.2d 383-84 ("We can add to the
trial court's articulated concerns our own conviction that a trial court has the discretion to avoid imposing upon the parties the time and expense involved in a battle of experts."); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 892, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979)
("[A]dmitting this testimony would open a floodgate whereby experts would testify
on every conceivable aspect of a witness' credibility.").
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dated or erroneous. For instance, an increasing number of
courts, including the Third Circuit,4 8 have questioned whether
the Frye admissibility test survived the adoption of the liberal admissibility standard prescribed in Federal Rule of Evidence
702."9 Other courts have correctly argued that Frye is inapplicable to such expert testimony.50 Moreover, even assuming that
Frye retains validity and applies to expert identification testimony, the present state of the psychological evidence underlying
such testimony satisfies its requirements. 5 '
48 In Downing, the court exhaustively reviewed the pros and cons of Frye and
concluded that
the Frye test suffers from serious flaws. The test has proved to be too
malleable to provide the method for orderly and uniform decision-making envisioned by some of its proponents. Moreover, in its pristine form
the general acceptance standard reflects a conservative approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if not
the precise language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For these reasons, we conclude that "general acceptance in the particular field to
which [a scientific technique] belongs," should be rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility. Accordingly, we hold
that a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific technique within the
scientific community is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
admissibility; it is, however one factor that a district court normally
should consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon the
technique.
Id., 753 F.2d at 1237.
49 See infra note 57. In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Mustafa v.
United States, 479 U.S. 953 (1986), Justice White, joined by justice Brennan, recognized a "conflict" among the circuits regarding the effect of Rule 702 upon Frye
and urged the Court to resolve "an obviously recurring and important issue." Id.
(White, J., dissenting).
50 See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236
(1984) (distinguishing between expert identification testimony and the scientific evidence, such as "novel devises or processes," to which Frye was intended to apply);
Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 184, 512 A.2d 1056, 1066 (1986) ("[T]he [Frye]
test is not properly applicable to [expert identification] evidence."). One commentator has argued that "the Frye standard has no relevance to such expert testimony
...[because] [t]he psychologist will not testify about novel devices that the jury
may view as 'magic' but will point out basic human perceptual and mnemonic abilities that have been the subject of extensive research." Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive
You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29
STAN. L. REV. 969, 1022-23 (1977).
51 Two United States Courts of Appeals have effectively concluded that eyewitness identification testimony satisfies Frye. See United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d
1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) ("This Court accepts the modern conclusion that the
admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications is proper. ...
We cannot say such scientific data is inadequate or contradictory."); United States
v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that since the First Circuit's
1979 decision in Fosher, which held that such testimony lacked "the standards of
reliability applicable to scientific evidence," the "science had gained reliability" and
that "the day may have arrived therefore, when [such] testimony can be said to
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The argument that such testimony usurps the jury function
"has been discredited and rejected by scholars, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and the Supreme Court. ' 5 2 Specifically, Dean Wigmore has labelled that argument a "mere bit of empty rhetoric
. . so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should be entirely repudiated"; 53 Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides that expert testimony "otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact"; 5 4 and the Supreme Court, in addressing
similar expert testimony, has recognized that jurors are "competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its
shortcomings.55
Similarly, courts have increasingly rejected the rationale that
the subject matter of expert identification testimony is common
knowledge and, hence, would not assist jurors. Instead, those
courts have concluded that its subject matter is largely counter*

conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory"). See also United States v.
Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("As the
most recent court decisions have found, the scientific study of eyewitness identification has become a respected and sophisticated one.").
52 Langford, 802 F.2d at 1183. The usurpation argument, which essentially
claims that the testimony would improperly override the factfinder's duty of determining credibility, is obviously at odds with the position that such testimony is too
general to assist the jury. See supra note 45. One court has recognized that its necessarily generalized nature precludes any finding that expert identification testimony improperly invades the jury's province:
The expert testimony in question does not seek to take over the jury's
task of judging credibility: as explained above, it does not tell the jury
that any particular witness is or is not truthful or accurate in his identification of the defendant. Rather, it informs the jury of certain factors
that may affect such an identification in a typical case; and to the extent
that it may refer to the particular circumstances of the identification
before the jury, such testimony is limited to explaining the potential effect of those circumstances on the powers of observation of a typical
eyewitness.
McDonald, 37 Cal.3d at 370-71, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 249 (emphasis in
original).
53 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1920, at 18 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). See WALL, supra note 1, at 213 ("[T]he objection based
upon the 'province of the jury' is no more than a shibboleth which, if accepted,
would deprive the jury of important information useful and perhaps necessary for a
proper decision on a difficult issue.").
54 FED. R. EvID. 704. The rule's primary purpose is to facilitate the admission of

expert testimony which will assist thejury. See FED. R. EvID. 704 Advisory Committee note ("In order to render [the helpfulness] approach [of FED. R. EVID. 702] fully
effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called 'ultimate issue' rule is
specifically abolished by [FED. R. EVID. 704].").
55

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983).
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intuitive.5 6 Beyond its inaccuracy, that rationale, is inconsistent
with the liberal admissibility standard prescribed in Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 7 which allows "an expert [to] be
employed if his testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact in
understanding evidence that is simply, difficult, [though] not beyond ordinary understanding.""
Accordingly, to the extent
Amaral and its progeny excluded proffered expert testimony by
finding that it would not "appreciabl[y] help" the jury, 59 these
decisions applied an overly stringent standard.60
56 See supra note 21. See also United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th
Cir. 1984) (concluding that the proffered expert testimony regarding three psychological factors-unconscious transference, cross-racial identification and the effect
of stress--"not only might have assisted the jury, but might have refuted their
otherwise common assumptions about the reliability of eyewitness identification");
McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 367-68, 690 P.2d at 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 247 ("It appears
from the professional literature, however, that [certain] factors may be known only
to some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to
the intuitive beliefs of most."); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 294, 660 P.2d 1208,
1221 (1983) ("We cannot assume that the average juror would be aware of the
variables concerning identification and memory about which [the proffered expert]
was qualified to testify.").
57 FED. R. EVID. 702 provides in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
58 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 451 (3d ed. 1982)).
See also FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee note (explaining that the Rule is
designed to permit expert testimony to inform jurors "to the best possible
degree").
59 United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The general

test regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the jury can receive

'appreciable help' from such testimony.") (quoting 7

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §

1923

(3d ed., 1940). The court explained that expert testimony cannot provide the requisite help unless it "serves to inform the court [and jury] about affairs not within
the full understanding of the average man." Id. at 1152-53 (quoting Farris v. Interstate Circuit, 116 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1941)).
Although Amaral was decided prior to the enactment of FED. R. EVID. 702, subsequent decisions which adopted and applied its four-criteria standard have held
that expert identification testimony is not "sufficiently beyond the ken of lay jurors
to satisfy Rule 702." Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383. On at least one occasion, the Ninth
Circuit has expressly refused to determine whether the Amaral standard "survive[s]
the enactment of Rule 702 as additional judicial requirements regarding the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal cases." United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d
1329, 1337 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982).
60 See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230 ("We have serious doubts about whether the
conclusion reached by [Amaral and its progeny] is consistent with the liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702."); McDonald, 37 Cal.3d at 369, 690
P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248. (After emphasizing that the applicable state
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Finally, the reasons underlying the expressed concern that
expert identification testimony is unduly prejudicial are largely
meritless. 6 1 First, the argument that identification experts would
overwhelm jurors restates the usurpation contention and is obviously contrary to the position that the testimony's subject matter
is within common knowledge. More fundamentally, as one court
has persuasively remarked, "it would be ironic to exclude such
[expert] testimony . . .on the theory that the jurors tend to be
unduly impressed by it, when jurors are far more likely to be un62
duly impressed by the eyewitness testimony itself."
Also unwarranted is the fear that the general nature of expert identification testimony, which again does not comment on a
particular witness' credibility but rather identifies factors which
affect the reliability of identifications under various conditions,6 3
would render its probative value minimal.6 4 Although some
nexus surely must be established between the proffered expert
testimony and the particular identification at issue,65riiad
criminal de
evidence rule "declares that even if the jury has some knowledge of the matter,
expert opinion may be admitted whenever it would 'assist' the jury," the court concluded that "although jurors may not be totally unaware of the foregoing psychological factors . . . the body of information now available on these matters is
sufficiently beyond common experience that in appropriate cases expert opinion
thereon could at least 'assist the trier of fact.' "); Langford, 802 F.2d at 1182 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("The evidence is overwhelming that the Amaral conclusionthat juries could not gain from such expert testimony-is untenable today.").
61 Of course, FED. R. EvID. 403 grants district courts broad discretion to exclude
otherwise admissible evidence where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs
its probative value. However, by its unambiguous language that Rule envisions a
case-by-case application of its balancing standard, not a blanket rejection in all
cases of a particular class of evidence deemed unduly prejudicial as a matter of law.
62 McDonald, 37 Cal.3d at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (1984).
63 See supra notes 27 and 52.
64 This position similarly arises from the misconception that jurors are aware of
the specific psychological factors which undercut the reliability of identifications.
See State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 480, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390 (1986), ("[Tlhe introduction of expert [identification] testimony would be 'a superfluous attempt to put
the gloss of expertise, like a bit of frosting, upon inferences which lay persons were
equally capable of drawing from the evidence.' "). See also United States v. Collins,
395 F. Supp. 629, 637 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (opining that such expert testimony "would
have done little more than add a scientific luster to the facts and ideas" already in
evidence); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 101, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1209
(1983) (although conceding that "[o]bviously there are aspects of these general
principles which might make some contribution in particular cases," excluding the
proffered testimony because "juries are not without a general understanding of
these principles and ...[must] have the opportunity to assess the witnesses' credibility on the basis of what is presented at trial and not solely on general
principles").
65 See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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fendants cannot be denied the opportunity to prove that nexus
by a blanket exclusionary rule. To blindly exclude all such testimony as unduly prejudicial is entirely unsupportable.66
Finally, the expressed judicial anxiety of a "battle of the experts" which might result from the more liberal admission of expert identification testimony is obviously insufficient to justify the
exclusion of probative defense evidence.67 Moreover, because
courts retain the discretion to exclude such testimony having insufficient probative value and to limit the number of experts who
may testify and the duration of the testimony, that anxiety has
been grossly overstated.68
V.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE:

UNITED

STATES V. DoWNING

Until recently, no appellate court had reversed a trial court's
exclusion of expert identification testimony.6 9 In 1985, however,
the Third Circuit became the first-and today, remains the
only-United States court of appeals to do so. In Downing, the
court repudiated several of the exclusionary rationales previously
articulated in Amaral and its progeny, reasoned that such expert
testimony is appropriate and should be admitted in certain cases,
and prescribed an admissibility standard for district courts to
utilize.7y
Three significant decisions preceded Downing. In 1983, the
Arizona Supreme Court vacated a jury's guilty verdict and ordered a new trial because the trial court had erroneously excluded a proffered identification expert.7 ' After analyzing the
psychological factors which the expert testimony would have encompassed, the court concluded that the evidence "was a proper
See supra note 61.
See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1243 n.27 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[I]f
the testimony is highly probative and meets the [specified] conditions . .. the parties are entitled to present it, whether or not it adds to the length of the trial; presumably such evidence will add clarity and enhance the truth-seeking function of
the trial, thereby offsetting the disadvantage of delay.").
68 Id. Indeed, although prosecutors will attempt to use rebuttal identification
experts where defense experts are admitted, the resultant "battle" will presumably
diminish the exculpatory effect of the expert testimony, which diminution should in
turn cause defense counsel to reserve their use of such testimony to cases in which
the psychological evidence clearly favors their clients. Hence, the prospect of having multiple experts proffered, let alone admitted, in every case involving an eyewitness identification is quite remote.
69 See State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1980).
70 See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
71 State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
66

67
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subject for expert testimony"72 and "would have been of considerable assistance" to the jury. The court then disagreed with the
trial court's conclusion that those factors "could be developed on
cross-examination and effectively argued without evidentiary
foundation" because they are within common knowledge.7 3
Rather, the court held that "the unusual facts of this case compel
the contrary conclusion ' 74 and reveal that the proffered testimony "would have been of significant assistance" to the jury.7 5
The following year, the California Supreme Court also reversed a jury conviction because the trial court had improperly
excluded proffered expert identification testimony. 76 In so doing, the court disagreed with the existing rationales for excluding
such testimony, concluding that it is not subject to Frye, does not
usurp the jury's function, and is sufficiently beyond common experience so as to assist jurors.7 7 The court then articulated the
specific circumstances under which a trial court should admit
proffered identification experts:7 8
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key
element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and
the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have af72

Id. at 291, 660 P.2d at 1221-22.

73 Id. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1224.
74 Id. at 292, 660 P.2d at 1223. Emphasizing that it did "not intend to 'open the
gates' to a flood of expert evidence on the subject," the court went to great lengths
to limit its ground-breaking holding to "the peculiar facts of this case." Id. at 293,
660 P.2d at 1224. Indeed, the court expressly approved the four-criteria admissibility test enunciated in Amaral and explained that it "ha[d] no quarrel with the
result[s] reached in" Amaral and its progeny, which the court recognized had "uniformly affirmed trial court rulings denying admission of this type of testimony." Id.
at 288, 293, 660 P.2d at 1218, 1224.
However, other than vaguely remarking that "many of [the prior decisions]
contain fact situations which fail to meet the Amaral criteria or are decided on legal
principles which differ from those we follow in Arizona," the court made no effort
to distinguish its holding from those prior decisions. Id. at 288, 600 P.2d at 1218.
In reality, Chapple explicitly rejects the precise rationale upon which Amaral rested:
that cross-examination is a sufficient protective device against the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications. See supra notes 10 and 35, infra note 118.
75 Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1224.
76 People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
77 Id. at 367-73, 690 P.2d at 718-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245-51.
78 However, in emphasizing that the trial court retains broad discretion in the
admissibility determination, the court cautioned that "such evidence will not often
be needed," and approvingly quoted the Chapple court's intention not to open the
floodgates to this type of expert evidence. Id. at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 254.
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fected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be
fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be
error to exclude that testimony.7 9
In so doing, the court in effect held that trial courts should admit
such testimony only in the "narrow circumstances ' 80 where the
identification is not "substantially corroborated" and the "specific
psychological factors" proffered are both not fully known by the
jury and sufficiently relevant to the identification to possibly affect
its accuracy."'
Finally, that same year the Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial
court had erroneously excluded expert identification testimony by
improperly determining that it was within common knowledge and
not sufficiently established in the scientific community. 8 2 On the
contrary, the court found that such testimony satisfied the helpfulness standard of Rule 70283 and "conform[ed] to a generally accepted scientific theory." 8 4 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
defendant's conviction by holding that corroborating evidence rendered the erroneous exclusion harmless.8 5
Against this backdrop, the Third Circuit confronted the conviction of John Downing.8 6 At trial, Downing's counsel had proffered

an identification expert to undercut the substantial impact of twelve
prosecution witnesses who had testified, with varying degrees of cer87
tainty, that Downing was a man they knew as Reverend Claymore.
The witnesses claimed to have observed Claymore for periods ranging between five and forty-five minutes during business dealings
later proven fraudulent.8 8 Downing countered that their observations were unreliable "because of the short period of time in which
the witnesses had to view Claymore, the innocuous circumstances of
79
80

Id.

Downing, 753 F.2d at 1231.
81 McDonald, 37 Cal.3d at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254. See also
supra note 78.
82 United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).
83 In so finding, the court distinguished its case, in which the proffered testimony "might have been relevant to the exact facts before the court," and the First
Circuit's decision in Fosher, in which the proffer did not make clear the relationship
between the scientific evidence offered and the specific testimony of the eyewitnesses. Id. at 1106-07. See supra note 45.
84 Id. The court also distinguished Fosher on this issue. See supra note 51.
85 Specifically, the court explained that the prosecution had presented three
identifying eyewitnesses and other evidence placing the defendant at the scene,
thereby "wholly discrediting the defendant's alibi." Id. at 1107-08.
86 United States v.Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
87 Id. at 1227-28.
88 Id. at 1227.
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their meetings with him, and the substantial lapse of time between
the meetings and the subsequent identifications." 8 9
In excluding the proffered identification expert, the district
court reasoned that his testimony would improperly usurp the jury's
function and that there existed sufficient inculpatory evidence beyond the identifications. 0 Because Rule 704 precisely repudiated
the former rationale9 ' and no such additional inculpatory evidence
93
in fact existed,9 2 judge Becker, writing for the Third Circuit panel,
adjudged that the district court had in effect
conclud[ed] that expert testimony concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identifications is never admissible in federal court
because such testimony concerns a matter of common experience that the jury is itself presumed to possess. Under this
approach, an expert's testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses can never meet the test for the admissibility of expert
testimony contained in Fed. R. Evid. 702. 9 '
Accordingly, the court framed the issue on appeal as "whether Rule
702 permits a defendant in a criminal prosecution to adduce, from
an expert in the field of human perception and memory, testimony
concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications." 95
After comprehensively reviewing the state of the psychological
evidence and prior judicial reactions to such testimony, the court
agreed with the "more recent cases" 9' 6 and concluded that "under
certain circumstances expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications can assist the jury in reaching a correct decision
and therefore may meet the helpfulness requirement of Rule
89 Id. at
90 Id. at

1227-28.
1228.

91 See supra note 52.

Downing, 753 F.2d at 1228-29.
Judges Gibbons, Becker, and Judge Dumbauld, sitting by designation from
the Western District of Pennsylvania, sat on the panel. Judge Dumbauld filed a
concurring opinion. Id. at 1244 (Dumbauld, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 1229 (emphasis supplied).
95 Id. at 1226.
96 Id. at 1230 (citing State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983);
People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 660 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984);
United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984)). The court further expressed "serious doubts about whether the conclusion reached by [Amaral and
other circuits] is consistent with the liberal standard of admissibility mandated by
Rule 702." Id. However, the court explained that those decisions, most of which
rested on more than one ground, "do not clearly indicate" their position vis-a-vis
Rule 702. Id. at 1230 n.5. But see supra note 59. Focusing on their purported reliance on trial court discretion, the court also refused to interpret those decisions "as
erecting an absolute bar to the admission of [such] testimony." Id. But see supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
92

93
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702." 9 7 In so concluding, the court relied upon the "inexorable"
logic of that Rule's liberal admissibility standard to characterize
prior judicial resistance to such testimony as "understandable given
its innovativeness and the fear of trial delay" but erroneous as a
matter of law. 98
The court then established a three-prong standard under which
district courts should determine, at an in limine hearing, the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. 9 9 The first inquiry requires a
district court to balance "(1) the reliability of the scientific principles
upon which the expert testimony rests, [and] hence the potential of
the testimony to aid the jury in reaching an accurate resolution of a
disputed issue; and (2) the likelihood that introduction of the testimony may in some way overwhelm or mislead the jury."' 0 0 That
inquiry replaced the Frye standard, which the court rejected as an
overly "conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence,'' ° with a policy-based determination designed to effectuate
the helpfulness standard of Rule 702 and its presumption of admissibility.' 0 2 Although the court left the district court to apply this
inquiry to expert identification testimony on remand, it directly
stated that such testimony "is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule
702." 103
The second inquiry focuses upon the "fit" between the proffered expert testimony and the identification at issue and requires
"a specific proffer showing that scientific research has established
that particular features of the eyewitness identifications involved
may have impaired the accuracy of those identifications.' 0 4 Stated
differently, the proffer must provide "an explanation of precisely
97
98
99

Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1226.

100 Id.

101 Id. at 1237. See supra note 48. Unlike McDonald, however, which deemed testi-

mony on eyewitness perception an unremarkable type of expert medical testimony
to which Frye did not apply, Downing broadly "define[d] 'novel' scientific evidence in
terms of whether judicial notice can be used to validate the scientific premises on
which the evidence rests." Id. at 1233 n. 11. Accordingly, Downing did not entirely
repudiate the rationale of Frye or its application to expert identification testimony.
Rather, Downing held that its concerns should merely be a part of a balancing test
rather than a dispositive prerequisite. Id. at 1237.
102 Id. at 1241.
103 More precisely, the court, despite remarking that "it would appear that the
scientific basis for the expert evidence in question is sufficiently reliable to satisfy
Rule 702," refused to so hold, as the Fifth and Sixth Circuits previously had. Id. at
1241. Instead, the court remanded the issue to allow the government an opportunity to brief the issue. Id. at 1242. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
104

Id. at 1226.
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how the expert's testimony is relevant to the eyewitness identifications under consideration" to ensure that such testimony is "sufficiently tied to the case."' 10 5 That requirement satisfies the concerns
expressed by numerous courts about the necessarily general nature
106
of the testimony and its relevance to specific identifications.
Finally, assuming the proffered testimony is deemed sufficiently
helpful under Rule 702 by satisfying the first two inquiries, the district court "retains discretionary authority under Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude any relevant evidence that
would unduly waste time or confuse the jury."'1 ° 7 However, the
court intimated that such discretionary exclusion would be appropriate only where physical evidence corroborated the identification
at issue. 08
The Downing admissibility standard for expert identification testimony closely resembles that adopted by the California Supreme
Court 0 9 and reflects the concerns of both the Sixth"o and Fifth"'
Circuits. Specifically, the Third Circuit encouraged its admission
where it is sufficiently: (1) reliable, as demonstrated by a balancing
Id. at 1242.
See supra notes 45 and 64 and accompanying text.
107 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
108 Id.at 1243 ("The availability of Rule 403 is especially significant when there is
evidence of a defendant's guilt other than eyewitness evidence, e.g., fingerprints, or
other physical evidence.").
Significantly, the court explained that "[t]he availability of other methods" alternative to expert identification testimony is not a "viable[]" exclusionary rationale. Id. The court specifically denounced cross-examination, the alternative
method endorsed by Amaral. Id. See infra note 118. Moreover, the court stated that
the mere fact that challenged identifications may be multiple in number or "more
than brief in duration" would not justify exclusion except "[i]n exceptional circumstances." Id.
109 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
I 10 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
III In a decision rendered after Downing, the Fifth Circuit, despite recognizing
that it had in Thevis previously "held that any problems with perception and memory are easily understood by jurors and can be adequately addressed through crossexamination," acknowledged the Smith and Downing decisions and "accept[ed] the
modern conclusion that the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identifications is proper." United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.
1986). Nevertheless, as in Smith, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction because substantial evidence corroborating the challenged identifications existed. Id.
at 1313. In so doing, the court implied that a trial court's exclusion of such testimony will be reversed as an abuse of discretion only where the challenged identification is so "critical" that it represents "the entire difference between a finding of
guilt or innocence." Id. The court concluded by "emphasiz[ing] that in a case in
which the sole [inculpatory] testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification may be encouraged." Id. (emphasis supplied).
105

106
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test involving the scientific principles proffered; (2) relevant, as
demonstrated by the nexus between those principles and the identification at issue; and (3) critical, as demonstrated by the absence of
physical evidence corroborating the identification.' 1 2 However, the
court emphasized that a district court may exclude such testimony
simply by finding that it fails to satisfy any one of those three criteria.'
More significantly, the court held that its review of district
court findings regarding any of the three factors is limited to determining whether the lower court abused its discretion.'"

VI.

ANALYZING DOWNING: THE FUTURE OF EXPERT
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY

The admissibility standard articulated in Downing, unlike the
blanket exclusionary rule effectively announced in Amaral and
adopted by the vast majority of courts, gives proper effect to the
liberal requirements of Rule 702, which encourages the admission of expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact and affords all such testimony a "presumption of helpfulness."" '
By
finding that expert identification testimony can "under certain
circumstances ... assist the jury"' 16 and that alternative methods
1 17
of conveying its subject matter to the jury lack "viability,''
Downing directly and correctly repudiates the two primary rationales underlying Amaral and its progeny." 8 Since Downing, many
courts have relied upon its reasoning to reject Amaral and deem
112 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
113 Id.
114 Id.

115 Id. at 1241 (citing In rejapanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723
F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 1231.
117 Id. at 1243.
118 As previously described, Amaral concluded that expert identification evidence
116

is an improper subject of expert testimony by finding that such evidence would be
no more helpful to jurors than cross-examination. See supra note 35. See also State

v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 893, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979) ("The jury was perfectly
capable of assessing the witness credibility by weighing the inconsistencies and deficiencies elicited in cross-examination."). However, Downing properly recognized
that, "[t]o the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great confidence in an
inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an effective way
to reveal the weaknesses in a witness' recollection of an event." Downing, 753 F.2d
at 1230 n.6. See also supra note 108. Numerous jurists have rejected cross-examination as a viable alternative to expert identification testimony. See, e.g., Watkins, 449

U.S. at 356-57 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Langord, 802 F.2d at 1183 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("[C]ross-examination cannot uncover the reasons for
misidentification because the witness honestly does not believe fie or she has misidentified the defendant.").
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expert identification testimony admissible in some cases.I 19
Unfortunately, two flaws in its analysis render Downing unlikely to cause any significant increase in the admission of such
testimony, even among district courts within the Third Circuit.
The first such flaw arises from the court's inexplicable refusal to
hold, despite directly stating, that expert identification testimony
satisfies Rule 702. By leaving resolution of that issue to the lower
courts and limiting its review of those resolutions to an abuse-ofdiscretion inquiry,1 20 Downing effectively insulates all exclusionary determinations sufficiently developed on the record. Trial
courts, of course, are entitled to broad discretion when weighing
probative value against prejudice. 12 ' However, no such discretion should protect from appellate review a trial court's balancing
of the reliability of certain scientific principles against their potential to confuse or mislead, the first criterion of the Downing
22
standard.
Indeed, despite Judge Becker's overt suggestion that "it
119 Most notably, the New Jersey Appellate Division recently reversed a conviction because the trial court, in excluding proffered expert identification testimony
by finding that its subject matter was within the common knowledge ofjurors, had
failed to conduct a pretrial hearing. State v. Gunter, 231 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div.
1989). In remanding, the appellate division reviewed the "proliferating Uudicial]
consideration of this evidential issue during the last half-decade" and concluded
that it "cannot foreclose the possibility that the requisite criteria for admissibility
would be met were a proper opportunity to establish them afforded." Id. at 44.
The court recognized that "[iun the four years since Downing, several jurisdictions
have either held that such testimony was admissible based on the showing made in
the trial court or that the proponent was entitled to the opportunity to make such a
showing." Id. at 46. See, e.g., Skamarocius v. State, 731 P.2d 63 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987); People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Co. Ct. 1985); People v. Beckford, 141 Misc. 2d 71, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Crim. Ct. 1988); People v.
Schor, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Dist. Ct. 1987); People v. Lewes, 137 Misc. 2d 84, 520
N.Y.S.2d 125 (Co. Ct. 1987); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795
(1986). But see contra United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 124 (1988); People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986);
State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 507 A.2d 1387 (1986); Bloodsworth v. State, 307
Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986).
The Washington courts have articulated the most precise position concerning
the admissibility of expert identification testimony, holding such testimony admissible where the challenged identification is the principal issue at trial, the defendant
presents an alibi witness, and little or no other inculpatory evidence exists. See
State v. Taylor, 50 Wash. App. 481, 749 P.2d 181 (1988); State v. Hanson, 46
Wash. App. 656, 731 P.2d 1140 (1987); State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692, 726
P.2d 1263 (1987).
120 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 803 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing the broad discretion afforded trial courts under Rule 403).
122 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
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would appear that the scientific basis for [expert identification
testimony] is sufficient to satisfy Rule 702,' ' 1 23 the district court
in Downing held on remand that the proffered testimony was unreliable, citing "the inconsistent results produced by the studies
and the lack of testimony regarding either the methodology of
those studies or the underlying data on which the test results are
based.' ' 24 Despite that apparent inconsistency with its prior
opinion, the Third Circuit
affirmed that second exclusionary
25
holding without opinion. 1
In so doing, the court opened the door to the exact evil
Downing sought to eradicate: the blanket exclusion of expert
identification testimony based not on its relevance to particular
cases but rather on its perceived unreliability in general. By insulating district court rulings under the protective cloak of abuseof-discretion review, Downing also renders incongruous admissibility determinations readily foreseeable. Such an intra-circuit
divergence on what is essentially a question of law cannot bejustified and should not be tolerated. However, by needlessly remanding the question and limiting its subsequent scope of
review, Downing invites the conflict.
The second flaw by which Downing improperly limits the future admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness perception is
its unmistakable message to lower courts that the existence of
physical evidence corroborating the challenged identification justifies excluding such testimony.' 2 6 The rationale underlying that
justification apparently is that corroborating evidence renders
the potential unreliability of a challenged identification sufficiently insignificant to make expert testimony establishing that
unreliability both unnecessary and needlessly time-consuming.
That rationale is simply unsupportable. Applied literally,
such an exclusionary rule would bar expert testimony addressing
Id. at 1241.
United States v. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784, 791 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 780 F.2d
1017 (3d Cir. 1986).
125 On remand, the district court also found that the "risk of misleading the jury"
and the lack of any "fit" between the proffered testimony and the identification also
compelled its conclusion that the testimony did not satisfy Rule 702. Downing, 609
F. Supp. at 791-92.
126 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243. In a subsequent decision, Judge Becker suggested
that any amount of corroborating evidence may be sufficient to exclude such testimony. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 419 n.10 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining
that the district court's error in excluding the proffered expert testimony could not
be deemed harmless "[b]ecause the crucial evidence against appellant consisted
solely of [the] identification") (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 725 (1988).
123

124
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identifications wanting any indicia of reliability solely by virtue of
corroborating evidence which itself may lack any such indicia.
More fundamentally, even where apparently reliable corroborating evidence exists, that mere existence cannot justify the exclusion of otherwise relevant defense evidence, particularly in light
of the demonstrably persuasive impact identifications have on juries. 2 7 Stated differently, the significance jurors attach to eyewitness identifications, 28 even to those fraught with unreliability, is
so demonstrably overwhelming that it effectively renders all
other evidence-both inculpatory and exculpatory-irrelevant by
comparison. Given the overriding influence of eyewitness identifications, the mere existence of corroborating evidence cannot
support the exclusion of expert testimony which may reveal the
identification as unreliable, and, hence, exculpate the defendant.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence, combined with the dilution of constitutional protections
designed to exclude unreliable identifications, necessitates the
adoption of additional judicial safeguards where such evidence is
both critical and disputed. The most effective such safeguard,
expert identification testimony, should be admitted far more frequently than presently allowed by the majority Amaral standard.
Enunciated over fifteen years ago by the Ninth Circuit, that standard is inconsistent with the more liberal criteria of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and has resulted in the near-blanket exclusion
of such testimony.
In Downing, the Third Circuit recognized the flaws of the
Amaral standard and recommended more lenient admission of
expert identification testimony. However, the tremendous discretion Downing afforded district courts, coupled with its open invitation to exclude such testimony in all cases except those based
solely upon a single uncorroborated identification, will regrettably prevent any significant increase in its admission. Hence,
criminal defendants who require expert testimony to attack unreliable identifications shall continue to face closed doors needlessly shut by a judiciary intent on limiting the scope and
127 Of course, the reliability of such evidence frequently will not be ascertainable
at the time of the in limine hearing prescribed by Downing.
128 See supra note 1. Indeed, studies demonstrate that the powerful impact of eyewitness identifications frequently overrides seemingly dispositive exculpatory evi-

dence. Id.
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duration of trials. Given the dismantling of the constitutional
protections developed twenty-two years ago to ensure the exclusion of unreliable identification evidence arising from unduly
suggestive pretrial procedures, those closed doors will almost
certainly and tragically facilitate the conviction of innocent
defendants.

